How to lose the ‘War’ - Part 1

[Chaminda Tilakumara]

The state controlled press yesterday reported that several Air Force personnel were arrested last week and that the Katunayake Base Commander, Air Commodore R. A. Fernando and Ground Defence Officer, Wing Commander Nihal Ratnayake had been transferred from their posts following the terrorist attacks at Katunayake.

Disciplinary action is usually taken against officers who were in immediate charge of establishments that suffered such attacks, after due and proper inquiries have been held. But in attacks of this magnitude which have seriously affected the nation’s defence and economic capabilities, inquiries should not only be centred on the particular incidents but encompass the wider defence strategies that had been deployed and those responsible for creation and implementation of such strategies.

The terrorists, it has been reported, were able to enter the two airports by cutting through wire barricades. Thereafter it appears that they had done a moonlight walk through the two airports and set upon their targets without any hindrance. The man- on - the street, who is no military strategist, is asking simple questions on how this could have happened. Weren’t the outer perimeters of the two vital airports patrolled? Were the inner and outer perimeters of the two airports landmined? Were there no sniffer dogs deployed and are these dogs meant only for kennel shows? Were there no electronic alarm signals for intruders set in place? Perhaps it could be said that more sophisticated defence techniques were deployed but the ultimate result was that the terrorists were able to wreak havoc at their will and pleasure.

Are only the Base Commander and the Ground Defence Commander to be held responsible? Was it not the responsibility of the officers above them, including the Air Force Commander to ensure that the two airports were effectively secured against terrorist attacks? Base Commanders, Ground Defence Commanders and the like are not retained in these posts for long periods of time. Thus, it is the responsibility of the Security Council, Secretary, Defence Chandananda de Silva, Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, Chief of Defence Staff Rohan Daluwatte, Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President Kumaratunga, to have ensured that sound defence strategies were in place to secure the vital military establishments. Had it been a mighty attack from land, sea and air and the defences did not hold, these top brass of the defence establishment could be exculpated with but the two highly fortified establishments being overrun by a band of around 20 youths, the question on the defence plans drawn up for these two airports arise.

Some of the reasons for successive military debacles are quite obvious. President Kumaratunga, the Defence Minister, is not only the Executive President but runs almost the whole gamut of government including defence and finance. Thus she has no time for defence. Her Deputy Minister of Defence, Gen. Ratwatte holds the key portfolio of Power and Energy while he being the minister in charge of fighting terrorism. He is in the midst of two crises – a power crisis and the military crisis. The power crisis will escalate leading to regular four hour blackouts in the year 2004 unless drastic action is taken, say experts of power and energy. He has no time for it. The situation demands he devotes full time for the ‘war’. But the minister continues undaunted trying to ride two crises.

cont.......part 2

[Chaminda Tilakumara]

cont.... from part 1

Defence Secretary Chandananda de Silva, the former Elections Commissioner is an authority on ballots but not bullets. He continues to head the Defence Ministry, which is clearly heading the wrong way. Civilians have headed the defence establishment before but is the present incumbent competent enough to handle the war situation such as when huge armament supplies have to be ordered at times without tenders being called? What is his military expertise?

Chief of Defence Staff, Rohan Daluwatte is the key official supposed to co-ordinate the activities of the three armed forces. The severe disasters suffered at the hand of terrorists both as Chief of Defence Staff and when he was the commander of defence establishments like Pooneryn raises questions why his period of service is being extended and he being elevated to the highest post in the services while extremely competent officers were not granted such favours.

President Kumaratunga has appointed a three-member committee to go into all aspects of the airport attack and submit a report to her. It is absolutely essential that the contents of this report should be made public. The defence establishment will attempt to use the traditional fig leaf of ‘security reasons’ to prevent the public from knowing the colossal blunders that were made. This is the absolute poppycock that has been dished out for long years. The two airports were overrun because the security systems collapsed not because of the security measures being made public. The flaws in the security measures that were deployed have to be exposed if the same tragedy is not to be repeated. There has been a regular pattern in which military establishments have been overrun by the terrorists and if the flaws were made public perhaps these debacles might not have occurred.

We recommend to those who seek refuge behind the fig leaf of security to read the speech by Dr. Abid Hussain, UN Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Opinion and Expression that is published in this page. He says: ‘The common excuse given is that security demands that certain plans and strategies of the government be kept secret from the people. This is a contradictory statement. If people are not informed why a question of security has arisen and not allowed to participate in decision making the will of the people is weakened and the problem is not solved. In many countries we have seen where in the name of security certain decision making dialogues have been kept secret, solutions have not been arrived at; had the people’s opinion been sought there would have been better progress’.

We are certainly not advocating that defence or battle plans are made public before the events. But if the political, administrative and military reasons are given why the Sri Lankan armed forces with superior manpower and armaments have taken so many hidings against a much smaller and weaker force, these disasters could be brought to a halt.

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Courtesy of The Island Editorial – 3 Aug 01